Why do investors excessively tilt their portfolio towards domestic assets? Recent studies suggest asymmetric information plays a signi…cant role in the home equity bias puzzle. A key assumption in theoretical models is that agents invest in assets and process information on their own. However, most international investments are executed by managers in …nancial institutions. These institutions allocate signi…cant resources to processing information, making the asymmetric information assumption less appealing. In this paper, we explain home bias at the fund level by showing how information asymmetry at the individual level has relevant implications at the portfolio management level. Agents delegate their investment decisions to portfolio managers of di¤erent and uncertain ability. Investors are better informed about the performance of domestic markets; and therefore, are more able to evaluate the ability of managers operating in these markets. This, in turn, makes investing in domestic markets less risky and attracts more managers. Additionally, highly skilled managers bene…t more from higher transparency, and this is why they are more likely to operate in the domestic market. We simulate the model and …nd that on average 76% of investment is in the domestic market.
Introduction
Many explanations for the puzzles in international …nance rely on asymmetric informationindividual investors are assumed to have more precise information about domestic markets than foreign markets. In particular, the idea that agents have a local information advantage has generated a large literature on the equity home bias puzzle. Because individual agents watch domestic TV, listen to domestic radio and read domestic newspapers, if agents process information and invest on their own, asymmetric information may result in home bias.
However, most international investments are executed by portfolio managers in …nancial institutions. 1 This fact does not pose a problem for information-based theories of equity home bias if fund managers su¤er from asymmetric information as well. However, many argue that the presence of institutionally managed funds sets limits to information-based stories of home bias. These institutions overcome information barriers about foreign markets by allocating signi…cant resources to information processing, eliminating the home bias as they are well informed.
In this paper, we propose a model of delegated asset management to study the implications of asymmetric information at the individual level on the equity home bias puzzle. We …nd that if investment decisions are delegated to fund managers with identical access to information in all markets, asymmetric information at the individual level combined with the uncertainty about the ability of the portfolio managers may result in home bias.
The model builds on Berk and Green (2004) and it is closely related to theories of delegation of portfolio management decisions such as Kothari and Warner (2001) only, and the entry decision is irreversible. Investors have a local monitoring advantagebecause they have more information about the fundamentals in the domestic economy, they are able to evaluate better the performance of domestic fund managers. When assessing the ability of the managers in the domestic market, investors compare their performance with the domestic fundamentals, while when assessing the ability of the managers operating in the foreign market, they are able to compare only the performance across managers. As a result, investors learn faster about the ability of domestic managers, which allows them to allocate their capital in the domestic market more e¢ ciently. That, in turn, leads investors to allocate more funds to the domestic market and generates home bias.
If managers are ex-ante identical, the initial home bias generated by the information asymmetry at the individual level attracts more fund managers to the domestic market. The domestic market becomes more diversi…ed, which ampli…es the equity home bias even further.
If managers are ex-ante heterogeneous on their ability, then more skilled managers enter the domestic market, which deepens the home bias generated by the initial local monitoring advantage.
The home bias puzzle was raised by French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995) . They showed that, at the beginning of the 90's, the fraction of stock market wealth invested domestically was around 90% for the U.S. and Japan, and around 80% for the U.K.
Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) updated the home bias numbers for the US and found no dramatic change. The share of domestic equity in the US portfolio in the year 2000 is around 88%, while its share in the world portfolio is 50%.
Recently, Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) and Hau and Rey (2008) have reported three stylized facts about the mutual funds investment style in the most developed …nancial markets: (1) On average, the number of international funds is larger than the number of domestic funds.
(2) On average, the market value of international funds is smaller than the market value of domestic funds. (3) There is equity home bias at the fund level.
Following Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) and Hau and Rey (2008) , we calibrate our model to have 46% of the fund managers in the domestic market and the rest in the foreign market.
Our model implies that investors are more able to asses the ability of managers operating in domestic markets; hence, in this market they are able to reallocate their investments to managers that are believed to be highly skilled more e¢ ciently. That implies that the domestic market is more transparent and it rewards the expected ability more. If ex-ante investors di¤er in the signal about their ability, more skilled managers enter the domestic market. This induces investors to channel even more funds to the domestic market. Hence, the market value of domestic mutual funds is higher than the market value of foreign funds and there is home bias. On average, the calibrated model implies that individual investors allocate 76% of their funds to domestic fund managers and the rest to foreign fund managers. Although our model underestimates the empirical home bias, it comes very close given the stylized nature of it.
In addition to explaining three stylized facts from the data, this model o¤ers the testable prediction that investors obtain, on average, higher returns on their capital in domestic funds. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) provide evidence that fund managers who display a stronger local bias achieve higher risk-adjusted returns. In the same line, Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2005) show that the average household obtains additional returns from its local holdings relative to its non-local holdings. Also, Grote and Umber (2006) show that the most successful M&A deals are the ones that display a stronger local bias. These …ndings are normally interpreted as investors having a local information advantage. These results are also consistent with the implications of our model. Because more skilled fund managers decide to operate locally, better deals and substantial abnormal risk adjusted returns are obtained in nearby investments.
There is a large literature on the equity home bias puzzle. Following Sercu and Vanpee (2008) , there are …ve types of explanations to the equity home bias puzzle. The …rst set of explanations to this puzzle focused on the lack of perfect …nancial integration, see Black 
Benchmark Model
We study a two-period economy with two countries: domestic (D) and foreign (F ).
There is a continuum of managers of measure one, and each manager either invests in the domestic market, invests in the foreign market, or stays out. There is a …xed cost of entry F M to market M; where M 2 fD; F g : Each manager can enter only one market, and the entry decision is irreversible. Let be the mass of managers who decide to operate in any of the markets, and let n denote the fraction of operating managers that enter the domestic market.
A manager j operating in market M has the ability to generate excess returns with respect to a passive benchmark: R M tj = j + v M t + " tj : Abnormal returns depend on the ability of the manager to acquire and process information about the likely prospects of individual assets. Some of this information is easily available to everybody in a given market and is disseminated via media or the word of mouth. The fundamentals, v M t ; measure how on average one could outperform the benchmark in country M using only country M 's assets if one had only the access to this type of information.
Some of the relevant information, however, is more di¢ cult or costly to gather and might be available to managers of the mutual funds only. Moreover, a highly trained manager might be better at interpreting this information. The ability, j ; capture this additional knowledge and asset picking ability that a manager brings to the table. We assume that j is normally distributed, j N ; 2 ; and is independent of other managers' abilities. And …nally, " tj is the error term, which is normally distributed and independent over time and across managers, " tj N 0; 2 " . The following assumption is one of the two main building blocks of our model.
Assumption A The ability of each manager, j is independent of the market he operates in, is constant over time, and is unknown to managers and investors.
Managers are paid a …xed fee, f , per unit of capital they manage, and there is no cost of active management. Managers maximize the present discounted pro…t, which is equivalent to maximizing the present discounted value of received capital.
There is a continuum of investors of measure one. Investors have a unit of capital to invest in both markets and mean-variance preferences with a coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion :
Investors invest only through mutual funds. Each investor draws a …xed number of funds, T; from the pool of all operating mutual funds, and each of these funds is drawn from the domestic market with probability n: Hence, the number of funds observed in the domestic market, N; is a random variable with the binomial distribution:
The set of observed mutual funds is constant for both periods.
The following assumption is the second important building block of our model.
Assumption B Investors observe domestic fundamentals, while they do not observe foreign fundamentals.
The …rst period is divided in three stages. First, managers decide simultaneously whether to enter, and if yes, into which market. Then, each investor draws T mutual funds and chooses their optimal portfolio. Finally, returns are realized. In the second period, investors observe the realized returns of the mutual funds they invested in,
; and the realization of domestic fundamentals, v D1 . They update their belief about each manager's ability and relocate their assets accordingly, incurring no switching costs.
Before we move to solving the model, let us discuss some of the assumptions. Hau and Rey (2008) shows that the distribution of the markets in which mutual funds operate is bimodal. The distribution has a peak for completely home biased funds and a peak for funds operating only in foreign markets.
Portfolio choice
In this section, we study portfolio choice of investors in each period, after the entry decision has been made and after each investor draws the funds she observes. Let q Dt (N ) and q F t (N )
denote the amount of capital invested in each market at time t by an investor who observes N mutual funds in the domestic and T N mutual funds in the foreign market. Since investors have one unit of capital, the investment satis…es q Dt (N ) + q F t (N ) = 1: Let x M jt (N ) denote the fraction of the capital that fund j receives from an investor that observes N domestic and T N foreign funds, and fund j among them. In what follows, we omit the arguments when confusion is unlikely.
The …rst period
We can view the portfolio choice as a two step procedure: …rst, taking the total amount invested in each market as given, the investor decides how to distribute q D1 (N ) and q F 1 (N ) among the funds she observes in each market. Second, she decides on q D1 (N ) and q F 1 (N ) ; taking into account how she will allocate these among the funds.
Since in the …rst period investors perceive all managers to be identical, the investor allocates the same amount of capital to all managers observed in a given market:
Taking this into account, the investor chooses q D1 (N ) and q F 1 (N ) to maximize her utility
; subject to the budget constraint q D1 + q F 1 = 1. The optimal amount of funds invested in each market is given by
The di¤erence in the amount of capital invested in each market depends only on the number of mutual funds observed in each market. The market with a higher number of mutual funds allows investors to better diversify the fund's speci…c risk; and therefore, it receives more funds.
The amount of capital invested by this investor in each observed mutual fund is obtained by plugging equation (2) into equation (1). Equation (1) implies that each manager in the more diversi…ed market receives less capital than each manager in the other market.
The second period
In the second period, investors update their beliefs about each manager's ability. In the domestic market, investors observe the realized returns of the managers they invested with,
; and the fundamentals v D1 ; and update
In the foreign market, investors observe the realized returns of all managers
, but they do not observe the fundamentals v F 1 ; hence
Formulas (4) and (6) are at heart of the results of this paper. In the domestic market, investors observe domestic fundamentals, and the realizations of other managers'returns do not carry additional information about particular manager's ability. Investors can isolate the impact of fundamentals from the impact of the ability and idiosyncratic noise. In the foreign market, on the other hand, investors do not observe fundamentals, and they estimate the ability of each manager by comparing his performance to the performance of other managers operating in this market. As a result, the uncertainty about the ability of the managers after the …rst period is higher in the foreign market, 2 F > 2 D : After updating their beliefs, investors choose the allocation of capital between the domestic and the foreign market, q D2 and q F 2 ; and the allocation of funds within each market,
. Given the amount of capital invested in each market, q D2 and q F 2 , investors
subject to
The allocation of funds in the domestic market is
Analogously, the allocation of funds in the foreign market is
The optimal allocation of capital between the domestic and the foreign market is obtained by plugging the optimal distribution of capital across managers, which is given by equations (8) and (9), into the objective function given by equation (7). Investors choose q D2 and q F 2 to maximize this objective function subject to the budget constraint q D2 + q F 2 = 1. The optimal investment in each market is
Formulas (10) and (11), hint already at the presence of home bias. From the perspective of the an investor, if markets are equally diversi…ed and the average expected ability in both markets after the …rst period is the same, then q D2 > q F 2 ; that is, this investor channels more capital into the domestic market. The reason is that the estimate of each manager's ability is more precise in that market, and from the perspective of the investors, the domestic market is less risky. Hence, the investor can better allocate her capital across mutual funds. However, home bias depends on the realization of N; which in turn depends on the entry decision of the managers. We analyze this problem in the next section.
Market entry
In the initial stage, the managers decide simultaneously whether they invest in the domestic market, in the foreign market, or stay out. Conditional on operating, they choose a market in which they expect to attract more capital. What is the payo¤ of a fund if it enters the domestic market? If n is the fraction of all operating managers in the domestic market,
and Pr (N jn) is the fraction of consumers that observe N domestic funds, then, there are Pr (N jn) N observations of this kind. This implies that the number of consumers that observe N domestic funds per domestic fund is Pr (N jn) N n : Analogously, the number of consumers that observe T N foreign funds per foreign fund is Pr (N jn) T N (1 n) : Hence, the expected excess pro…t of a manager from entering the domestic market is
In equilibrium n must be such that the expected excess pro…t from entering the domestic market is equal to the di¤erence in the entry costs:
where is the discount factor.
Results

Benchmark case
We are interested in home bias generated by imperfect information about managers' ability combined with investors' asymmetric information about markets' fundamentals. Hence, we need to analyze the benchmark case in which investors can observe foreign fundamentals as
well. In such a setting it is equally easy for investors to estimate the ability of all managers,
Using the formulas derived above, conditional on N; the allocation in the …rst period is the same as in the asymmetric case, and the allocation in the second period is like in expressions (8), (9), (10) and (11), but with 2 D substituted for 2 F : It is straightforward to prove the following lemma (all proofs are in the appendix).
Lemma 1 When the cost of entry in both markets is the same, F D = F F ; in the benchmark case the equilibrium fraction of …rms operating in each market is 1 2 ; and in expectations each market attracts the same amount of capital.
Asymmetric case
Let n a and n b be the equilibrium fraction of …rms operating in the domestic market in the model with asymmetric information and the benchmark model, respectively. Denote the total expected amount of capital invested in the domestic market at time t in the two models by
For now, we will consider the case in which the entry cost is the same in each market.
Proposition (1) states that in equilibrium there are more mutual funds in the domestic market.
and there is home bias in both periods.
Home bias results from two e¤ects: a direct one and an indirect one. First, investors have more precise information about managers'ability in the domestic market; therefore, they can distribute their investments better than in the foreign market. This causes them to channel more capital to the domestic market even if the number of mutual funds in each market is the same. However, due to this primary home bias, more managers enter the domestic market.
This results in a multiplier e¤ect: the domestic market becomes more diversi…ed attracting more capital. Home bias becomes even more severe.
Heterogeneous managers
In this section, we analyze what happens when managers are not ex-ante identical. The ability of each manager consists of a publicly observed signal, y j and an unknown, random factor i ; that is, j = y j + j ; where j N 0; 2 ; and j and i are independent for i 6 = j: The signals are observed before managers choose in which market to operate. The rest of the game is as in the previous section. When we want to stress that we look at a manager in a particular market, we denote the signal of manager j who enters market M by y M j : This public signal can be interpreted as the curriculum vitae of the fund manager being public information. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) showed that managers who attended higher-SAT undergraduate institutions have systematically higher risk adjusted excess returns. Also in their paper, they make reference to a 1994 study by Morningstar, Inc. reported on by Business Week (July 4, 1994, p. 6) in which "over the previous …ve years diversi…ed mutual funds managed by "Ivy League" graduates had achieved raw returns that were 40 basis points per year higher than those of funds managed by non-Ivy League graduates."
Allocation of capital by investors
Given the signal structure, in the …rst period the expected ability of manager j is y j : Let us look …rst at investment choices of an investor who observes N mutual funds in the domestic market, and let y D = 1 N P N j=1 y D j and y F = 1 T N P T N j=1 y F j be the average expected ability of the domestic and the foreign mutual funds that she observes. It is straightforward to derive the …rst period optimal allocation of capital across markets
The amount of capital invested by this investor in fund j with signal y j is
if the fund operates in the domestic market, and
if the fund operates in the foreign market.
The total amount of capital invested in a given market is increasing in the diversi…cation of this market and in the di¤erence between the average expected quality of managers in this market and the other market. Each manager is better o¤ in a market that is not well diversi…ed, has higher average expected quality, and has lower expected average quality compared to the quality of that fund's manager.
As before, in the second period investors update their beliefs about the ability of the managers. In the domestic market, each investor observes signals about abilities, fy j g N j=1 , and the realized returns,
; of all managers which she encounters, as well as the domestic fundamentals, v D1 : She updates her beliefs in the following way 
In the foreign market, each investor observes signals about about abilities, fy j g T N j=1 , and the realized returns,
; of all managers which she encounters, but she does not observe the foreign benchmark, v F 1 : She updates her beliefs in the following way
The second period optimal allocation of capital across markets is
and across managers is
Market entry
When deciding which market to enter, a manager with signal y j estimates how her ability will be perceived in the second period, and this estimate is the same in both markets:
The ex-ante expected optimal allocation of capital received by a manager with y j in the second period from an investor who observes N domestic mutual funds is obtained using equations (24) and (25):
if the manager is in the domestic market, and
if the manager is in the foreign market.
Equilibrium
We can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium, the average quality in the domestic market is higher, y D y F , and one of the following holds:
a) there exists a threshold ability y; such that all y j y enter the domestic market and all y j < y enter the foreign market; b) all managers are indi¤ erent between the markets and there are fewer managers in the domestic market.
Before we discuss the implication of this result, let us explain the intuition behind it. To understand which managers enter the domestic market, we need to see how the entry incentives vary with the expected quality y j : Let 2 M t be the uncertainty about the quality of a manager in period t in market M; and let us look at how much capital is attracted by manager with quality y j when he enters market M (this notation allows us to express equations (16), (17), (26) and (27) in one; :M denotes market other than M ):
An increase in manager j's expected quality y j has two e¤ects: a direct and an indirect one.
The direct e¤ect makes the di¤erence between the quality of this manager and the average quality in his market, y j y M ; increase. The magnitude of this e¤ect depends on how e¤ective a given market is in rewarding quality. If 2 M t is the same in both markets, as it is in the …rst period, the direct e¤ect of the increase in y j is the same for both markets. In the second period, the domestic market is better at rewarding quality, 2 Dt < 2 F t ; hence, other things equal, better managers have higher incentives to enter the domestic market.
However, there is also the indirect e¤ect: the average quality of funds that investors of fund j observe, y M ; depends on y j : Increasing y j ; increases y M ; which has two e¤ects: …rst, the market attracts more funds overall because the average quality is better (the …rst term in equation (28)); and second, the di¤erence y j y M decreases (the second term in equation (28)). Given that the …rst e¤ect is shared by all mutual funds observed in market M; and the second e¤ect is speci…c to fund j; the second e¤ect dominates. This means that the manager with quality y j would like to a¤ect y M as little as possible, which is positively correlated with market diversi…cation.
These two e¤ects together imply that unless the domestic market is strongly undiversi…ed, better managers go to the domestic market. This immediately allows us to conclude that if in equilibrium all managers are indi¤erent between the markets, it must be that the domestic market is less diversi…ed, n < Why is there no equilibrium in which n < 1 2 and better …rms go to the foreign market? In such equilibrium, the domestic market would be less diversi…ed, have …rms of low quality and reward quality more in the second period. Under these circumstances, a very good manager from the foreign market would bene…t a lot in the domestic market from having quality well above the average; hence, he would have an incentive to deviate at the entry stage.
Let us now discuss the implications of Proposition (2). In the empirical paper, Hau and Rey (2008) show that the distribution of mutual funds is bimodal: most of the mutual funds invest overwhelmingly either in domestic assets or in foreign assets. Given that we constrain managers to invest in one market only, we are unable to provide any insight on this …nding.
However, we can shed some light on the curious fact that there are more mutual funds investing mainly in the foreign assets, but these funds are smaller on average than the ones investing domestically. Proposition (2) says, that funds investing domestically are better; hence, they attract more capital than those investing in foreign assets. Moreover, it is possible that there are fewer funds investing domestically. Whether this is the case, depends on the distribution of the signals about quality, but the intuition developed by the proof of Proposition (2) suggests that there are fewer domestic funds when there is large heterogeneity in how mutual funds are perceived. 3 When the heterogeneity is large, the average quality in the foreign market is very low compared with the quality in the domestic market. Consider a manager operating in the domestic market. If he deviated to the foreign market, since he is better than average, he would receive much more capital than the average manager in the foreign market. This deviation will not be optimal only if the average capital per manager in the foreign market is low to start with, and this can be the case only if this market is very crowded. which implies that the standard deviation of fundamentals, ; is set to 1% and the standard 3 In our simulations, we always obtained n < A nice property of this model is that the numerical results are independent of the mean of the ability of the fund manager, , and the mean of the fundamentals in the economy, .
Numerical Analysis
Hence, there is no need to take a stand on the debate of the relative performance of fund managers with respect to passive benchmarks. For the model with heterogeneous managers, in the numerical example, we assume that y j follows a uniform distribution over the interval . In particular, the calibrated model implies n a = 63:1%. This panel also shows that the higher is g, the larger is the fraction of …rms in the domestic market in equilibrium. According to Panel B, if g = 0, on average, the total expected amount of capital invested in the domestic market is Q a D2 = 63:1%. This panel also shows that the higher is g, the higher is the amount of capital invested in the domestic market. In particular, for g = 1:5%, the amount of capital invested in the domestic market is Q a D2 = 87:3%. The benchmark model has the salient feature that in equilibrium n a > 1 2 . This contradicts the evidence provided by Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) and Hau and Rey (2008) in which on average, the number of international funds is larger than the number of domestic funds. For the benchmark model to generate n a = 46%, we need foreign …xed costs, F F , to be lower than domestic …xed costs, F D , or g < 0, which is di¢ cult to support. there is a threshold ability y; such that all y j y enter the domestic market and all y j < y enter the foreign market when
> 0 in equilibrium; or b) all managers are indi¤erent between the markets and there are fewer managers in the domestic market when
= 0 in equilibrium. In both equilibria, there also exists a threshold ability such that managers stay out. Panel A shows the value of this derivative for di¤erent values of g. If g = 0, then equilibrium b) exists and
shows that if g = 0, then the fraction of domestic funds n a that makes all managers indi¤erent between operating in the domestic and foreign market is given by n a = 34:02%. According to Panel C, if g = 0; then the total expected amount of capital invested in the domestic market is Q a D2 = 55%. According to Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) and Hau and Rey (2008) on average, the fraction of domestic funds is 46%. For this equilibrium to generate the fraction of domestic funds implied by the data n a = 46%, we need g = 1:5%, as one can see in Panel B.
According to Panel A, if g = 1:5%, then
Hence, there exists a threshold equilibrium. According to Panel C, even though n a < 1 2 , if g = 1:5%; then the total expected amount of capital invested in the domestic market is Q a D2 = 76:25%. Hence, the market value of international funds is smaller than the market value of domestic funds and there is equity home bias at the fund level. From Panel D, in this equilibrium, for any g, the average ability of fund managers in the domestic market, y D , is higher than the average ability in the foreign market, y F . Therefore, in this equilibrium with a 1.5% di¤erence in …xed costs, the calibrated model accounts for three salient features of the data about fund managers at the international level. Although our model underestimates the empirical home bias, it comes very close given its stylized nature.
Conclusion
The main criticism to information-based stories of home bias relies upon the assumption that there is no local information advantages at the fund level. Hence, if individual agents invest through mutual funds, then information asymmetries at the individual level disappear and there is no home bias in fund manager's portfolios. However, Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) To conclude, information-based stories of home bias cannot be disregarded as a complementary explanation to the equity home bias puzzle such as hedging domestic risks channels, barriers for foreign investments stories, corporate governance and transparency issues and behavioral-based explanations.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Using equation (12), one gets
We will show that 1 = 0 when n = 1 2 and that 1 < 0 i¤ n > 
The result completing this proof will be used extensively in the later proofs, hence we state it as a claim.
Claim A Using (29), we get
Hence, 1 (n)
Proof of Proposition 1
If F D F F ; we need that in equilibrium 1 + 2 0: Plugging (1) and (2) into (12), one
Plugging (8) and (9) into (12), one gets
The …rst term in the bracket is increasing in 2 F ; and the second term is decreasing in 2 F ;
and since 2 F is greater than 2 D ; when we plug 2 D instead of 2 F ; we get:
Hence,
The right hand side is 0 for n = 1 2 ; because of symmetry. Also, we have:
Hence, for n 1 2 ; we have
Therefore, 1 + 2 = 0 only if n > 1 2 : Now, we will move to proving that home bias occurs in expectations. By de…nition of Q a Dt ; we have
Hence, home bias is
Using formula for E h x D jt jN i ; we get
Hence, we have a home bias in the …rst period. In the second period, using the (10) and (11), we get
Proof of Proposition 2
The manager enters the domestic market if 1 (y j ) + 2 (y j ) > 0 and the foreign market if 1 (y j ) + 2 (y j ) < 0 and is indi¤erent when 1 (y j ) + 2 (y j ) = 0: First, we will look at how the entry incentives depend on the quality signal.
Abusing notation, let y D and y F be the expected quality in the domestic and in the foreign market. When making the entry decision, each manager expects that, excluding him, his investors will observe funds of average quality. Plugging the formulas for asset allocation into the di¤erence between the expected amount of capital received in the domestic and in the foreign market in each period (equation (12)), we get:
Taking the derivatives of 1 (y j ) and 2 (y j ) with respect to y j ; we get:
The derivative
does not depend on y j ; hence, there can be at most three types of equilibria: one in which better …rms enter the domestic market,
one in which better …rms enter the foreign market,
and one in which all …rms are indi¤erent between both markets,
We will show now that better …rms going to the foreign market cannot be an equilibrium:
…rst, we will establish that better …rms might go to the foreign market only if n > 1 2 (STEP 1). Otherwise, a manager with y j = y F would like to go to a less diversi…ed, lower quality domestic market which o¤ers a high return to quality. Then we will show that when n > 1 2 ;
> 0; which means that the better managers want to go to the domestic market (STEP 2), which is a contradiction.
STEP 1
Assume that better managers enter the foreign market, y D < y F : Plugging y F into the formula for 1 (y j ) and grouping terms with y D and y F ; we obtain the following formula for the expected excess capital of the mutual fund with y j = y F operating in the foreign market:
The derivative of the second term with respect to 2 v is
hence we get that 1 y F is larger than than the right hand side evaluated at 2 v = 0 in the second term:
Using the fact that for the binomial distribution, E [N ] = T n and E N 2 = T n T n 2 +(T n) 2 ;
we get that the second term is 0: By Claim A, the …rst expression is positive for n 1 2 ; hence we have that
In the second period, we have:
We have
Hence, if we plug 2 D < 2 F instead of 2 F ; the right hand side is smaller than y F :
by By Claim A from the proof of Lemma 1 + y F y D (1 n) n P T N =0 Pr (N jn) 
We have shown that when y F > y D and n < 1 2 ; then the manager operating in the foreign market with y j = y F ; would receive more capital in the domestic market in both periods.
Hence, for y F > y D to be an equilibrium, we need n > 1 2 : STEP 2
For the …rst period,
dy j can be rewritten:
The …rst term is weakly positive for n 
In the second period:
Pr (N jn) N + 2n T n 1 n 
Hence, we have proved that when n 
